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A SUPREME CHALLENGE: REDUCING JUDICIAL RELIANCE ON THE
PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE IN IMMIGRATION LAW

Introduction
Plenary power is an "official doctrine of special judicial deference"' to the
political branches' authority to establish and enforce immigration laws.* The term,
immigration law, is used here to describe the body of law governing aliens' admission to
and exclusion from this country? The judicial branch has used the doctrine to avoid
addressing the constitutionality of immigration statutes and regulations. It is without
doubt that the plenary power doctrine is in decline? Predictions of its demise have been
around for decades.' Much of the decline is attributed to "subconstitutional" decisions
that have chipped away at the d ~ c t r i n e .These
~
decisions have become a way for courts
to apply statutory solutions to avoid striking down statutes as unconstitutional. Although
contributing to an expansion ofjudicial review in immigration cases, they have not been

I

See Stephen Legomsky, "Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts," 22
Hastings Const. L.Q. 925 (1995) ("Ten More Years") (U.S. Supreme Court '%as translated the differences
[in immigration law] into an official doctrine of special judicial deference to Congress...it has described
Congressional power to regulate immigration as 'plenary"') citing e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel. 408 U.S.
753, 766,768,769 (1972); Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967).
2
See e.g., Fonp, Yue Tip, v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,711 (1893) (it is the "right to exclude or to expel
all aliens.. .being an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to
its safety, its independence, and its welfare. ..); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,
542 (1950) (authority over immigration matters stems not just from legislative power "but is inherent in the
executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation."); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
588-89 (1952) (any policies toward aliens...are "so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
yovemment as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.")
See also Stephen Legosmky, "Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power,"
("Plenaly Power"), 1984 Sup. Ct.Rev. 255,256 (1985).
4
Hiroshi Motomwa, "Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms
and Statutory Intelpretation," ("Immigration Law") 100 Yale L.J. 545,550 (1990).
5
See Legomsky, "Plenary Power" 1984 Sup. Ct.Rev. at 307. (An inevitable breaking point will be reached
when the lower coufls dissatisfaction with plenary power becomes too large.) See also Peter H. Schuck,
"The Transformation of Immigration Law," ("Transformation") 84 Columb. L.Rev. 1,4,90 (1984) (The
central elements of classical immigration law are under siege and immigration is gradually rejoining the
mainstream of our public law.) See also Legomsky, "Ten More Years," Hastings Const. L.Q. at 934. (The
Supreme Court will allow the plenary power doctrine to wear away by attrition.)
6
See Motomura, "Immigration Law," 100 Yale L.J. at 549.

for either man. As a result, both face indefinite detention. Ma and Zadvydas challenge
such detention as a violation of their substantive due process right to liberty. Petitions
for certiori were granted in both cases.I6
The Court is unlikely to expressly overrule the doctrine. However, it could
further weaken plenary power by refusing the government's request to apply it. It could
do this under statutory interpretation by determining that the Attorney General does not
have the authority to detain aliens indefinitely. Or the Court could determine that once it
is no longer a means to effectuate deportation, detention is outside the realm of
immigration policy. Thus, the doctrine is irrelevant to these indefinite detention cases."
Either way, the doctrine would be further eroded and restricted in its use by the lower
courts.'s

Part One of the paper provides the background of the plenary power doctrine and
reviews the evolution of immigration law over the subsequent century in light of the

-and Zadyvdas decisions in the lower courts as
doctrine. Part Two discusses the Ma
examples of both the schizophrenic nature of immigration jurisprudence and evidence of
the necessity for the Supreme Court to narrow the'use of the plenary power doctrine.

threshold of initial entry," and placed in INS custody, are "excludable" aliens. See Shaughnessy v. United
States ex. rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,212 (1953). The Supreme Court has recognized additional
Constitutional rights and privileges for deportable aliens. For example, they are entitled to procedural due
process during deportation proceedings. See Yamata v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). See also Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21.32 (1982) ("once an alien gains admission to o w country and begins to develop the
ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.")
16
Reno v. Ma, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000) (consolidating the
and Zadwdas cases).
"This argument was made by both Ma and ~ a d v ~ d a -s .
Legomsky argues that a "restricted plenary power dochinnew 'PPDlite-"is much more likely than
a complete abolition of this special deference by the Court. 'Ten More Years," 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. at
937.

''

A. Establishment of Plenary Power in Classical Immigration Law
The doctrine was articulated in three casesz9forming the foundation of what
would be known a s "classical immigration law."30 The opinions recognized absolute
congressional power to exclude aliens from United States temtory. The source of that
power emanated not from an enumerated power in the ~onstitution~'
but firom an inherent
sovereign power that is "an incident of every independent nati~n."'~The Court pointed
to the preservation of independence and security against foreign aggression as the highest
duty of any government a duty that is exclusive to the legislative and executive
bran~hes?~
Judicial review of constitutional limitations protecting individual rights was
therefore precluded.
The Court's primary concern in the Chinese Exclusion Case was whether the 1888
statute excluding Chinese laborers from the United States was "beyond the competency
of Congress to pass."34 Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese laborer and long time resident of the
United States, had returned to China for a visit. When he tried to reenter the United
States, he was prevented from doing so because of a law that had been passed in his
absence baning the return of Chinese laborers. The Court's opinion set the ftamework

See the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651
1892) and Fong Yue Tinp. v. United States, 13 S. Ct. 1016 (1893).
Until 1875, immigration law did not exist in the United States. Classical immigration law confronted for
the first time the country's perception that immigration needed to be regulated in significant ways. See
Schuck at 2.
" Several enumerated powers over immigration were suggested in other cases. They included the
commerce power, the naturalization power, and the war power. See Legomsky, "Supreme Co-"
1984
Sup. Ct.Rev. at 274.
See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603.
" See id.
" See id. at 603.

"

intere~t."'~Fong Yue Ting, a long time resident of the United States, was ordered
deported because he did not have a certificate of residence required under an 1892 ~ct!'
He challenged his detention and deportation as a deprivation of liberty without due
process and as a violation of 6th and 8th Amendment rights.
The Court, asserting what came to be a fundamental tenet of classical immigration
law:'

claimed that deportation is not punishment for a crime."

Therefore, provisions of

the Constitution securing right of trial by jury and prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment had no application to the case!'

The legal consequences of this

controversial determination that deportation is a civil, administrative proceeding are still
being felt today by aliens whose constitutional challenges to indefinite detention are
being rebuffed by the courts.

All three dissenters in Fong refbsed to buy the assumption that deportation-"the
forcible removal of a person from home, family, business, and property"44-is not
punishment. "No euphemism," the Chief Justice declared, can "disguise the character"

" See Fong Yue Tin& 149 U.S.at 724.
10

Chinese Deportation Act of 1892,27 Stat. 25, c. 60. Act allowed the arrest and detention of any Chinese
laborer without a certificate of residence. To avoid deportation, the laborer had to establish, through the
testimony of a "credible white witness," that be was a resident of the United States at the time the Act was
enacted.
See Schuck, 'Transformation," 84 Colum L.Rev. at 25.
See Fong Yue T i g , 149 U.S. at 730. The Court wrote:
"The order of deportation is not punishment for a crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in
which that word in often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his counhy by way of punishment. It is
but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the
conditions upon the pefiormance of which the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional
authority and through the proper departments, has determined that his continuing to reside here shaU
depend."
See id. at 732.
See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740. (Fuller,C.J., Brewer, J., Field, I., dissenting).

"

"

"

of national sovereignty, the overpowering force of stare decisis, and external influences
on judges.'2 Among the external influences on judges are societal and ideological

For example, before the 188OVs,an expansionist policy of essentially open borders
prevailed with mass immigration actually encouraged, as people were needed to populate
the American fkontier and to supply needed labor.'4

Eventually, the country's attitude

towards new arrivals hndamentally shifted as the firontier began closing and urban
industrialization took center stage. Immigrants began to be seen as a hindrance rather
than a benefit to society, and exclusionary immigration policies replaced the ideology of
openness.5s Chinese laborers who had begun arriving in the United States around 1850
when labor was in short supply were no longer wanted when the labor market became
glutted. Anti-Chinese prejudice grew as their immigration into the United States
continued.
During the 1880's, a new wave of immigrants from Japan became the next target
for nativist

sentiment^.'^

The public hostility towards Asians seemed not to be lost on the

Court whose references to "vast hordes of [Chinese] crowding in upon usws7who "might
endanger good orderws8are troubling at the least?g It was during this period of anti-Asian

beginning to give way ...as lower courts are testing and sometimes transcending the confines of the
classical canons.")
52 See discussions by Legomsky, "Plenary Power," 1984 Sup. Ct.Rev. 255; "Fear and Loathing," 78 Texas
L.Rev. 1615. See also Schuck, "Transformation," 84 Colum. L.Rev. 1.
See Schuck, "Transformation," at 2.
See id.
55 See id.
56 See Legomsky, 'Tlenary Power," 1984 Sup. CtRev. at 288.
" See Chinese Exclusion Case. 130 U.S. at 630.
" See Fong Yue Ti,149 U.S. at 717.
'9 See Leeomskv's discussion of the "vitriolic attacks" aeainst Chinese immimts bv Justice Field who
authoredthe majority opinion in the Chinese Exclusion Case where the Court fust rLcognized an inherent
Congressional power to exclude aliens. "Plenary Power," 1984 Sup. Ct.Rev. at 289.
~

~~~~~-~~

-

-

detention must have as its purpose the effectuation of deportation became the basis for
constitutional challenges of aliens' whose deportation was practically impossible. 67

In another result differing sharply fi-om classical immigration law's treatment of
alien's rights, the Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins held that invidious discrimination by a
~ ~ statute
state against any nationality is prohibited by the 14th ~ m e n d m e n t .The
successfully challenged was an ostensibly race neutral municipal ordinance making it
impossible for aliens of Chinese descent to operate laundries in San Francisco.
One commentator, Hiroshi Motomura, views these two seminal cases as the
emergence of "phantom constitutional norms" decisionmaking in immigration law.69
They are part of a long line of cases affording protections to aliqs that are outside the
field of "immigration law," that is, the law of admission and expulsion of aliens. These
phantom norms are borrowed from mainstream public law, Motomura argues, and stand
in stand in stark contrast to the unreviewable plenary power norm the courts use when
they directly decide constitutional issues in immigration cases.70 The phantom cases,
although favorable in their outcomes to immigrants, are not controlling when
constitutional immigration law issues are raised."

The two conflicting sets of

constitutional norms that emerge over the next 100 years have resulted in a confusion and
tension in immigration law that are with us today.

See Ma, 208 F.3d 815, Zadvydas, 185 F.3d 279. See also supra notes 12, 13,lS and related text. See
also Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 2001 FED App. 0033P (6th Cir. 2001) discussed at notes 127-134 and
related text.
See 118 U.S. 356,374 (1886).
69
Motomura, "ImmigrationLaw," 100 Yale L.J.at 564,565.
See id. at 549.
" See id.
67

"

D. Resurgence of the Full Harshness of Plenaw Power: the 1950's
The decision that the Court made to essentially free exclusion proceedings from
any significant constitutional restraints7' while limiting government's plenary power only
in deportation proceedings-and

then, minimally, would have significant effects during

the 1950's. It was in this period that national hostility towards aliens was at another high,
in part a result of the typical anti-alien backlash of a major war and in part because of the
. ~ ~ Court's response
public's perception that aliens were associated with ~ o m m u n i s m The
during the McCarthy era to several constitutional challenges in both the exclusion and
deportation arenas yas remarkable for the absence of constitutional protections.77
In two cases challenging deportation orders:'

the Court reinvigorated the plenary

power doctrine when it declared that Congress could constitutionallydeport long time
permanent residents on the basis of their past membership in the Communist Party. In a
line notable as an example of the influences on judges of popular political attitudes, the
Harisiades Court said that if American citizens can be sent to foreign countries "to stem
the tide of ~ornmunism,"~~
then it is hard to justify why the Constitution should spare
Communist aliens from the severity of d e p o r t a t i ~ n .Since
~ ~ "expulsion is a weapon of
defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent in every

"See id. at 101,102.
l5 See Schuck's discussion of the extraconstitutional status of exclusion. "Transformation." 84 Colum.
L.Rev. at 18.
Legomsky, "Plenary Power," 1984 Sup. CtRev. at 290.
Schuck describes as "notorious,"Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 70 S. Ct. 309) (1950). See "Transformation,"
84 Colum. L.Rev. at 20. Hart calls several of the majority
"aberrations"citing only "theharsh
- - opinions
precepts of the earliest decisions." See 'The Power of Congress," 66 Harvard L.Rev. at 1392.
'8 ~ e e ~ a r i s i a d v.
e sShaughnessy. 342 U.S. 580 (1952) and-Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
'9See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591.
See id.

"

the consequences of deportation were so close to punishment for a crime, and that
perhaps the ex post facto clause should be applied, the Supreme Court would not because
the "slate is not clean."88 Judicial deference was too well "imbedded in the legislative
and judicial tissues of our body politic."89
The dissents in both cases called the majority to task for placing more importance
in an implied power of deportation over an express right to life and liberty. Quoting
Justice Brewer's dissent in Fong, the Justices reminded the Court that the "doctrine of
powers inherent in sovereignty is both indefinite and dangerous."g0 Congress was
ordering people to be deported for what they once were rather than for being a current
danger to the safety and welfare of the nation.
The absence of constitutional protections in exclusion proceedings made judicial
deference even starker. "Admission as a privilege, not a right" was a theory justifying the
Court's conclusion in Knauff v. Shaughnessy that due process for entrants is whatever
Congress says it is?' In that case, the government's exclusion of Knauff, the alien wife of
a U.S. citizen, was challenged for due process deficiency. The Court ruled that a hearing
was not required, nor did the government have to disclose the reason for its decision that
had been made on the basis of confidential i n f ~ r m a t i o n . ~ ~
The government's plenary power to exclude aliens often involves the awesome
power to detain. In classical immigration law, the power to detain was seen as a

" See id at 531.
See id.
See Harisiades, 342 U.S.at 600.
9' See 70 S.Q. 309,313 (1950).
92 See id. at 547.
89

90

=f

and Mezei together confirm that the where the alien is located and what

constitutional right he is seeking in large part have determined the Court's response. An
alien "outside" (pretend or for real) of the United States, would have a difficult time
challenging immigration decisions.
E. Modem Plenary Power Cases
In the next decades, the Court continued to stand fast to the plenary power

doctrine. In several cases, the Court rebuffed significant constitutional issues in
immigration statutes, even when those issues affected United States citizens. In
Kleindienst v.

ande el:^ the Court accorded "unprecedented"'00 deference to the

Executive branch when it refused to review the Attorney General's decision to deny entry
to a journalist, Ernest Mandel, who advocated world communism. Six United States
citizens joined Mandel in challenging provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
statute. The citizens, university professors, had invited the journalist to speak at various
forums and complained that the statute deprived them of their First Amendment free
speech rights to meet with Mandel in person for discussions.
The Court refused to apply the compelling interest standard of review implicated
in the denial of a hndamental constitutional right. Instead, it found that the Attorney
General had given a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for his decision, and the
Court would not look further."'

Although it afforded "unprecedented" deference to the

Attorney General's discretionary decision, the fact that the Court conditioned approval on
a legitimate reason for the decision was significant. The government argued that it did
not have to give any reason for its decision. In making this point, the Court was careful

"408 U.S.753 (1972).
See id. at 777. (MarshalU., Brennan, J., dissenting).

The majority noted that the government's power to exclude or expel aliens is
largely immune'08from judicial control. It would not in this case review the statute for

equal protection defects since immigration legislation was "solely for the responsibility of
Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control."'09 The dissent aptly
quipped, "such review reflects more than due deference; it is abdi~ation.""~
Since the Japanese Immigrant Case in 1903, procedural due process claims for
deportable aliens were the only exception to the plenary power doctrine.'" Yet the
exception was used sparingly as Court decisions reflected unwillingness to overturn
government decisions even for procedural defects.'I2 The Supreme Court's 1982 decision
in Landon v. plasencia,'13 however, marked in retrospect the "arrival of the due process
revolution in immigration law." 'I4 Maria Plasencia, a returning permanent resident, was
refused reentry after her visit to Mexico, and placed into exclusion proceedings. She
then alleged several due process violations. Although in

m,the Court said a

returning resident's constitutional status was no greater than someone seeking admission
for the first time,'I5 that is, no due process protections applied, the Court here declared
that a returning resident, although an excludable alien, was not necessarily barred from
procedural due process claims.'I6 The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to
explore whether Plasencia was accorded procedural due process.117

See id. at 792.
See id. at 796.
"O See id. at 805 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
111
Motomura, "CuriousEvolution,"92 Columbia L.Rev. at 1638.
"'See id. at 1652.
' I 3 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
I" See id. at 1638.
I1*SeeMaei.345 U.S. at 213-214.
'I6 See Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32-34.
'I7See id. at 37.
lo'

IW

In its reversal, the en blanc panel would not, however, reach the same
subconstitutional abuse of discretion decision. In fact, it determined that the Executive
had the power to discriminate on the basis of national origin in making parole decisions,
since those decisions are an integral part of the admissions process-an

area of plenary

power. It also reaffirmed the lack of constitutional rights plaintiffs, as excludable aliens,
have. It noted that the Executive's power over immigration has two sources: the power
delegated by Congress through immigration statutes and the inherent power h m its
plenary power over foreign re1ati0ns.I~~It is when the President enjoys constitutional
power in his own right as well as that delegated, noted Justice Jackson, that the
President's authority "is at its ma~im."'~'And, by implication, where judicial review is
most problematic.'26
Courts have used this double source of power, the Eleventh Circuit said in Jean,
as justification for the "remarkably broad delegations of authority" that Congress has

given the Executive in the immigration field.I2' Nevertheless, the "Court's repeated
statements that decisions by the political branches in the immigration area are 'largely
immune from judicial control' (i.e., Fiallo)clearly do not altogether preclude judicial
scrutiny" of executive action.I2' That scrutiny, however, would be minimal.'29
In 1980, about 125,000 Cubans fled their native country from the port of Mariel.
Some of these "Marielitos" were excludable from the United States, often because of

727 F.2d at 965.
Younnstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.579,635-36 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Interestingly, like in Youngstown, here executive power to exclude aliens (like executive power to seize
steel mills) is not clearly enumerated in the Constitution.
I" See Schuck, "Transformation."84 Colum. L.Rev. at 18.
'21 727 F.2d at 967.
Iz8 See id. (Citations omitted.)
Iz9 See id. The scope of review over executive discretionary decisions in the immigration field is
"extremely limited."
IZI

no right to be free from detention because whatever procedures Congress authorized were
due process for excludable a~iens."~
Nevertheless, the 9th Circuit did feel a need to comment that the Cubans were not
really being indefinitely detained because they had the opportunity during an annual INS
review of each case to prove they were no longer a threat to ~ 0 c i e t y . IThe
~ ~ dissent called
the majority to task on this fiction saying that it could try to recharacterize the
confinement "as a series of one year periods of detention," but that did not alter the reality
that since the INS can successively deny parole, plaintiffs' detention is indefinite and

In a marked departure from subconstitutional decision making, the 6'hCircuit
recently found that the INS had statutory authority to detain excludable aliens indefinitely
but lacked the constitutional authority to do so. 13* Mario Rosales-Garcia anived in the
United States during the Cuban boatlift, was granted parole, and later sewed a federal
prison sentence for criminal activity. Upon his release from prison, Rosales was taken
back into INS custody pending deportation to Cuba. He was denied parole. Rosales
became one of 1,750 Marie1 Cubans remaining in U.S. prison facilities who are neither
eligible for parole nor

135

-

Mezei, 73 S.Ct. at 629 and Knauff v. Shauahness~338 US. at 544. See also supra notes 82.89 and
related texts.
Bamera-Echavema, 44 F.3d at 1450.
See id. at 1451.
The court applied former 8 U.S.C. $ 122qe) (1994) because Rosales was declared excludable in 1987
and his immigration parole was last revoked prior to the implementation of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Responsibility Act (IRRIRA). $ 1226(e)was repealed and reenacted by Congress in IRRIRA. Six
circuits (2nd, 3rd, Sth, 7th, 9th 10th) have found §1226(e) to authorize the Attorney General to detain
indefdtely an excludable alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony. See Rosales-Garcia v.
Holland 2001 FED App. 0033P, '29 to*33 (6'Cir. 2001).
-*17.
(Since he was not declared excludable until 1987, Rosales was not among those named in the
1984 agreement between U.S. and Cuba under which Cuba agreed to the return of 2,746 excludable aliens
from the Marie1 boatlift.)

'"

''

framework to conclude Rosales' indefinite confinement was indeed punishment in
violation of his liberty interest.I4'
Contrary to the 91hCircuit in Barrera-Echavania, the 61hCircuit refused to
conclude that INS annual review of detainees' parole status meant detention was not
indefinite. Even monthly review, it commented, would not change the fact that Rosales
will not be released until Cuba agrees to accept him (a prospect the court discounted) or
until INS grants him parole. Since INS has broad discretion to deny parole, Rosales
could never be certain of receiving it, no matter how well he behaves.146
The 6h Circuit also swam upstream when it decided it would not require
excludable aliens to show that deportation was impossible before their detention would
be considered indefinite.I4' Instead, the court put the burden on the government to
demonstrate that "(1) the alien's home nation and this government are engaged in
diplomatic discussions which encompass a specific repatriation agreement whose details

are currently being negotiated, and (2) the alien is among those whose repatriation the
agreement ~ o n t e m ~ l a t e s . " ' ~ ~

In its opinion, the court determined that plenary power doctrine had "lost its
rationale altogether" when detention was no longer a means to effectuate dep~rtation.'~~
When it directly conflicted with an alien's fimdamental constitutional interest in liberty,
deference became "less compelling."'50 The 6'h Circuit refused to accord the Executive
branch the deference traditionally due under the doctrine.
See id. at *52-69.
See id. at *66.
147
See e.g., Zadvvdas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5* Cir. 1999) (detention is not indefinite until there is
a showing that "deportation is impossible, not merely problematical, difficult, and distant'?.
Rosales, 2001FED App. at *65.
Id9 id. at *69.
Id. at *68.
Ids

146

court.'57 When issues collateral to the legal questions in deportation orders arose,
jurisdiction lay in district courts under federal question, habeas corpus and INA
provisions.'58
In 1996, perhaps in partial response to frustration with judicial encroachments
into immigration matters, Congress enacted amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) that would have direct bearing on judicial review of Executive
authority. Moreover, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), judicial review of final orders of deportation against those who were deemed
deportable for enumerated criminal convictions was e1imi11ated.I~~

In the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(ITRTRA), changes to the INA went even further than under AEDPA. ITRTRA denied
judicial review not only of certain orders of removal but also of INS decisions to detain
deportable aliens pending rem0va1.I~~
In an "exclusivejurisdiction" section, IIRIRA bars
review of "any claim by or on behalf of an alien arising from the decision or action of the
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien under this chapter."I6'
The Act also eliminated statutory distinctions between exclusion and deportation
proceedings, replacing them with a single removal proceeding.'62 It is unclear how this
change will ultimately influence constitutional analysis of protections that formerly

5 1105a.
5 1331 provided federal question jurisdiction; 28 U.S.C.A. 5 2241 provided habeas corpus
jurisdiction; 8 U.S.C. 5 1329 provided jurisdiction for all claims arising under the immigration laws.
Is9 F'ub. L. No. 104-132,110 Stat 1214 (1996), 8 U.S.C.A. 5 1105a(10)(West Supp. 1998).
Pub. L. NO. 104-208,110 Stat 3009 (1996), 8 U.S.C.A. 5 1226(e) (West Supp. 1998).
16' IRRTIlA 5 30qa), 8 U.S.C.A. 5 1252(g) (West Supp. 1998).
'sI

8 U.S.C.

'" 28 U.S.C.A.

I" 8 U.S.C.A.
1225 (West Supp. 1998) Some distinctions remain. The burden of proof is on the
government when deporting an alien, but on the alien when determining excludability. See David Cole,
"Congress and the Courts," 86 Geo. L.J. at 2486,2487.

B. Impact of IRRIRA on the long term detention of Kim Ho Ma and Kestutis Zadvvdas
The Supreme Court's decision in AAADC was crucial for non-removable'69
immigrants with final deportation orders in "mandatory detention" claiming statutory
which went
error or abuse of discretion. Mandatory detention provisions of IIRIRA'~~
into effect in 1998 authorize the confinement of virtually all aliens deportable on criminal
grounds including those who have received final orders of deportation, for 90 days
following their order of rem~val."~IIRIRA provides the INS "may" retain aliens after
the 90-day period'72and release of those with criminal convictions is permitted only if
the detainee does not constitute a flight risk ordanger to the community.173 The
mandatory confinement provisions have led to a "surge" in administratively detained

Among those in detention with final deportation orders are resident aliens Kim Ho
Ma and Kestutis Zadvydas. The felony convictions of both men triggered mandatory
detention and deportation.

Ma is a Cambodian who amved in the United States as a
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Immigrants who are in i n d e f ~ t eINS custody because no country will accept them and INS will not
release them. See Donald M. Kerwin, "Throwing Away the Key: Lifers in INS Custody," Interpreter
Releases, Vol. 75, No. 18 (1998). See also supra note 131.
Pub.L. No. 104-208,110 Stat. 3656 (Sept. 30,1996), 5 303, amending INA 5 23qc).
17' 8 U.S.C. 5 123l(a)(l)(A)-(B). IIRIRA also mandates confmement of almost all inadmissible aliens on
criminal and national security grounds (INA 5 236(c)(1)); asylum seekers in the "expedited removal
process" until they demonstrate a "credible fear" of persecution (INA $235(b)(l)(B)(iii)(IV)); and aliens
who appear inadmissible for other than document related reasons (INA 5 235(b)(2)(A)).
IT2
8 U.S.C. 5 1231(a)(6).
INA 5 236(c)(2).
17' Kerwin, Interpreter Releases, Vol. 75, No. 18, p. 650. In fiscal year (FY)
1996, the INS had bed space
for 8,592 adminismtive detainees at any one time. By FY 2000, according to the U.S. Department of
Justice's May 1997 "Federal Detention Plan," it was to have ballooned to 23,376 per day, a 172 percent
increase in four years.
17' 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(l) (Supp II 1996). Although legal permanent residents had been subject to
deportation for criminal convictions prior to the 1996, the new laws (IRRIRA and AEDPA) made such
deportation mandatory in large classes of cases. In the past, INS could consider such issues as whether the
person had shown rehabilitation, whether deportation would hurt family members, and whether the person
had strong ties to his country of origin. The new laws virtually eliminates individual assessment of the
appropriateness of deponation. For an important discussion of these and other consequences on immigrant

INS. The INS also petitioned the Dominican Republic to admit Zadvydas because his
wife was born in that country. The Dominican Republic did not respond. Zadvydas
remained in INS detention from 1994 until his release in October 1997 by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of ~ouisiana."' Ma remained in detention
from April 1, 1997 until October 25, 1999 following the grant of his petition for writ of
habeas corpus by the Western District of ~ a s h i n ~ t o n . "Both
~ men challenged the
constihltionality of the INS decisions to deny them parole. Their cases have wound their
way up to the U.S.Supreme Court, which granted certiori in October 2000.
C. Collision between substantive due process challenges and the plenary power doctrine
in the Ma and Zadvydas district courts.
The schizophrenic nature of immigration caselaw is glaringly obvious in the
district and appellate courts' responses to the constitutional challenges brought by Ma and
Zadvydas. Certainly, the challenges collide with plenary power doctrine. The decisions
of the two district courts reflect their discomfort with the doctrine and desire to
circumvent it somehow. The Ninth and Fifth Circuits, deciding appeals in the &&Ia0

and

~adwdasl'' cases respectively, handled the collision by either refusing to apply the
doctrine (the 9th Circuit) or reinforcing it (the 5th Circuit).
Both Ma and Zadvydas claimed their indefinite detention pending deportation was
beyond statutory authority'82and beyond permissible constitutional limits under the due

United States v. Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D.
La. 1997).
Unpublished Order filed Sept. 29,1999; No. C99-151L.
'"Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000).
'I Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
In general, after an alien is found movable, the Attorney General is required to remove him within 90
days after the order is fmal. 18 U.S.C. 5 1231(a)(l)(A)-(B). However, "an alien ordered removed who is
inadmissible under sec. 1182, removable under sec. 1227...or who has been determined by the Attorney
General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal may be detained
beyond the removalperiod...U.S.C. $ 1231 (a)(6).
I"

'"

The Eastern District Court for Louisiana deciding Zadvydas paid lip service to the
plenary power accorded Congress in enacting immigration statutes. It referenced the
principle that "in exercising its broad power over immigration and naturalization,
'Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.""88 It
agreed that the language of the INA"~authorized the Attorney General to indefinitely

'

detain deportable aliens.Ig0 Applying the rational basis standard, it proceeded to analyze
under the United States v. Salerno testI9' whether indefinite detention violated Zadvydas'
substantive due process rights.
The Louisiana district court considered first whether detention constitutes
punishment or is incidental to another government interest. Second, it considered
whether detention is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it.Ig2
Analyzing the text of the statute, it was clear to the district court that Congress did not
intend detention as a means of punishment for those who have already served their
criminal sentences. Rather, the purpose was to protect the community from dangerous
felons, and to effectuate deportation by preventing aliens from fleeing.lg3
Although other courts'94 had said that continued deportation of excludable aliens
was not an excessive means of accomplishing the goals of the statute, the court here
found "particularly troublesome" the potential infinite duration of detention for the

Zadwdas ,986 F.Supp, at 1024 quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
8 U.S.C. 5 1252 (a)(2)(A) provides for the detention of aggravated convicted felons.
'90Zadv~das,986 F.Supp. at 1025.
19' 481 U.S. 739 (1987). See supra note 144 and related text.
19' See id. at 1025, 1026 quoting Gisben v. United States Attorney General, 988 F.2d 1437, 1441 (5th Cir.
1993).
'93 See id. at 1026. See also Wing Wong ,163 U.S. 228 (1896), supra, where the U.S. Supreme Court
established that detention as part of the means necessary to give effect to the exclusion or expulsion of
aliens is valid.
See Gisbert, 988 F.2d 1437 and Caballero v. Caplinger, 914 F.Supp. 1374 (E.D.La. 1996).
Is8

Is9

Ma's petition for habeas corpus was one of more than 100 pending in the Western
District Court. Each contained procedural and or substantive due process challenges to
continued detention. Of these 100, the court selected five representative cases of which
Ma was one. A five-judge panel issued a joint order in these five lead cases. On
doctrinal grounds, the panel pointedly rejected the government's argument that
petitioners' legal status had "assimilated" to excludable once final deportation orders were
issued and they therefore lacked constitutional protections?02 The Supreme Court
previously held that a lawhl permanent resident who leaves the United States and later
seeks reentry may "assimilate" to the status of a continuously residing lawhl permanent
resident for purposes of his constitutional right to due process. 203 However, the
government had offered no precedent that used the assimilation doctrine to reduce the
constitutional protections of lawful permanent residents who had not left the country, and
the Washington district court refused to establish such precedent.204This meant that the
court would treat petitioners as deserving of Fifth Amendment due process protection.
In a move making vivid the lower courts' "extreme disquiet"205with plenary
power, the panel explicitly decided to reject the doctrine's relevance in post-deportation
order detention cases.206 It acknowledged that judicial deference was supported by
plenary power doctrine in substantive immigration matters, but indefinite detention of
aliens with final deportation orders was not a matter of immigration

Nor do the

cases raise foreign relations questions, the court said.208Finally, since detention threatens

"'Phan v. Reno, 56 F.Supp. 2d 1149,1154 (W.D.Wa. 1999).
m3 See Kwong Haie Chew v. Coldin%344 U.S. 590 (1953).
2cd See &, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
'05 Leaomskv. "PlenawPower!' 1984 Sm.Ct. at 296.

'08

See id.

deported.215 Without that realistic chance, detention is no longer an aid of deportation
and thus is "excessive" in relation to the government's interesL2l6

In response to petitioners' procedural due process claims, the panel determined
that since the procedure as applied to all claimants was the same, its decision would be
applied equally to all 100 cases.2" Utilizing the Mathews v. ~ l d r i d g etest,
~ ' ~the panel
found that the risk of erroneous deprivation of petitioners' liberty interest was too great to
provide anything less than full procedural due process. It required a hearing before an
immigration judge at which evidence could be presented to support release pending
deportation. The immigrationjudge must specifically explain how the decision to deny
parole was reached given each petitioner's unique circu~nstances.~~~

As the panel directed, the judge reviewing Ma's particular case first addressed his
substantive due process challenge.220It concluded, "there is not a realistic chance that the
government will accomplish Ma's deportation to Cambodia," and "Ma's interest in liberty
clearly outweighs the government's present interest in detaining him." Ma was ordered
released. 221 Since the case was resolved on substantive due process grounds, the court
did not reach the procedural due process question. In an unreported order, the court
denied the govemment's motion to stay Ma's release pending its appeal to the 9Ih
The 91h Circuit and U.S. Supreme Courts affirmed the district court's order.223

"'See id.
See id.
See id.
424 U.S. 3 19,334-335(1976). The test considers the interest at stake, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or
different procedural safeguards, and the interest of the government in using current procedures.
Phan v. Reno, 56 F.Supp. 2d at 1156.
220
Ma v. Reno, Ordm Granting Writ of Habeas Corpus, fded 99/29/99,No. C99- 151L.
See id.
2U Brief for Respondent, Reno v. Ma, 2000 U.S. Briefs 38, *I (Dec. 22,2000).
See id.

limitations into statutes that appeared to confer broad power on immigration oficials in
order to avoid constitutional problems."230 For example, in Jean v. Nelson, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that immigration parole does not permit race discrimination in order
to avoid reaching the constitutional question?3'
Implicit in the 9fh Circuit's narrow interpretation of the statute is that it would not
apply the plenary power doctrine in this case. This unwillingness to apply the doctrine
could be considered a de facto limitation on its

In fact, in a footnote, the court

made a point of rejecting INS' argument that it was entitled to substantial deference for
all immigration-related

decision^?'^

Citing INS v. ~ h a d h a , ~ ' noted
~ i t that the U.S.

Supreme Court has not applied the doctrine in every case and "it is not clear why it
should be applied here."235
Like the Western District Court of Washington, it refused the government's
efforts to assimilate petitioners to "excludable" status with limited due process protection.

,
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It rejected the government's argument that the 9th Circuit's decision in Barrera-Echavama

v. is on'^^ and the U.S. Supreme Court's -'''

decision were controlling. The

constitutional questions." (other cites omittea. The 6' Circuit in -pointedly
did not use the canon
of constihltional avoidance when it found that the statute gave the Aaorney General authority to detain
indefinitely. Instead, it based its decision on a due procesi violation. 200i FED App. at *33.
231 See2)0
208 F.3d at 15.
See id at 18, citing Jeao,472 U.S. 846,854-56 (1985). See also supra, notes 111-114 and related text.
U2 See Motomura, "Immigration Law," 100 Yale L.J. at 549 ("Many courts have undermined the plenary
ower dochine through statutory interpretation.") See also supra note 51.
208 F.3d at 30.
~ 3 '462 U.S. 919,940-41 (1983) (striking down law governing suspension of deportation, stating that "what
is challenged here is whether Congress has chosen a constitutionallypermissible means of implementing
the [plenary] power ...Congress has plenary authority in all cases in which it has substantive legislative
'urisdiction, so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction.")
See id. at 30. The 6' Cir. also cited
for the proposition that judicial deference in the
immi$zatioo context becomes less com~ellinewhen it directlv conflicts with other constitutionalinterests.
~ o s a G s2001 FED App. at *68.
U 6 3 d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). (the govemment has the statutory authority to detain
m d e f ~ t e l yan undeportable, excludable alien)
345 U.S. 206 (1953) (the government has the authority to indefmitely detain an excludable alren) See
also supra, note 97 and related text.

g3

"

"'
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order had become final, the court said in deference to the govemment, he no longer had
the due process protections afforded to legal residentsz4' Unlike the 9th Circuit, the
court here implicitly accepted the government's assimilation-to-excludable-status
argument. Reiterating dicta in m f f , 2 4 6the 5th Circuit affirmed that "the exclusion of
aliens is a fundamental act of national sovereignty" that "stems not alone from legislative
power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the
nation."247 In other words, because of the plenary power doctrine, the district court was
without authority to conclude that Zadvydas' liberty interests were violated.
Nor did the 5th Circuit accept the lower court's conclusion that Zadvydas would
but
never be deported. The circuit court achowledged that Zadvydas was "~tateless""~
since Lithuania had not "definitively denied"249Zadvydas' citizenship application,
deportation was still possible.

Traditional deference would be shown to the political

branches in matters of immigration policy, the court concluded, until there is showing
that deportation is impossible, "not merely problematical, difficult, and di~tant."~"
The 5th Circuit attempted to buttress its position that Zadvydas, as a resident alien
with a final deportation order, has the same constitutional rights as an excludable alienno more, no less. It first acknowledged that an excludable alien has some due process
and other constitutional protections. It then agreed that deportable aliens are entitled to
procedural due process regarding the government's decision to deport them. But once a
See id. at 290.
United States ex. Rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 70 S.Ct. at 312. See also supra notes 90-91 and related
text.
"'See Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 288.
See id. at 292.
249 See id.
"O See id. at 294.
~~~~~~

alien, the government must now worry about two things. First, getting a country to
accept him and second,'wonying if he'll commit a crime against the general
population.257The whole point of earmarking criminal aliens for deportation or
exclusion, the court clarified, is "that while we must tolerate a certain risk of recidivism
from our criminal citizens, we need not be similarly generous when it comes to those who
have not achieved ~ i t i z e n s h i ~ . ' ' ~ ~ ~
The 5Ih circuit concluded that the "government may detain a resident alien based
on either danger to the community or risk of flight while good faith efforts to effectuate
the alien's deportation continue and reasonable parole and periodic review procedures are
in place."259Zadvydas appealed to the U.S.Supreme Court.
E. The U.S. Supreme Court's Pending Review of Ma and Zadvydas

On October 10,2000, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and
consolidated the

and Zadvydas cases for oral argument.260 Oral argument took place

on February 21,2001. As of this writing, the Court has not yet issued its decision.
The Court is likely to determine for how long the Attorney General is authorized
under 8 U.S.C.4 1231(a)(6)~~'
to detain aliens ordered deported but who cannot be
removed for the foreseeable future. In so doing, the Court will decide whether it will
grant the deference that the government claims is due the political branches. It is most
unlikely that the Court will expressly overmle the plenary power doctrine. But it can and
should narrow the doctrine by refusing to apply plenary power in these two cases. It can
do this implicitly by interpreting the statute under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
--

~p

See id.
See id. at 296-297.
See id. at 297.
'*Reno v. Ma, 121 S.Q. 297 (2000).
2s'

different parts of a statute to have the same meaning. Therefore, the government argues,
"Congress must have intended the same language to confer the same authority with
respect to each category."266
The Court should refuse to accept the government's statutory construction
argument. What is most objectionable about it is its blithe disregard for 100 years of
jurispmdence. By attempting to remove the substantive due process protections that the
Court had previously extended to deportable aliens, the government is presuming
extraordinary power without express delegation by Congress. The Court should not use
the cover of the plenary power doctrine to permit this presumption to stand. Instead, it
should determine that some clearer demonstration of Congressional intent is needed
before the Court will conclude that the government is authorized to "put so drastic a
limitation on the rights of [deportable] aliens by so indirect a means, particularly when
[Congress] could have easily included express language to that effect in the ~tatute."'~'
Although the outcome is not at all sure, it is hopeful the presumption will not
stand. During oral arguments, several members of the Court, including Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, appeared conce~nedwith the government's assimilation-to-excludable
status theory.268 Justice O'Connor pressed the government for precedent supporting its
position and did not seem appeased by the

case that the government raised. She

questioned whether there wasn't a "vast difference" between saying a person who has
never been in the country (albeit partly fictional) has not acquired Constitutional

265

345 U.S. 206 (1953). See supra notes 96-98 and related text.

'"See id. at '47.

See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d at 34. See also supra note 242 and related text.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, Zadvydas v. Underdown v. Ma, p. 46, Alderson Reporting Co., Inc.
11 11 Fourteenth St. NW,Washington, D.C. 20005.
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Bail Reform Act, the decision maker here is the INS district director, not a neutral judge
or magistrate.'"
The Court should also reject the government's argument that deference should be
accorded because negotiations with a foreign country concerning a deportable alien's
return affects international relations and foreign

Because these negotiations can

be sensitive and difficult, says the government, it is especially important that the judiciary
not give the appearance of speaking with a different voice than the executive branch.276
A foreign country could misinterpret a judicial opinion ordering release of a detained

alien as implying that the United States believes the removal is futi~e.~"
Invoking foreign policy as cause for judicial restraint in immigration cases is not
new.278 The Court in the past has oken referred to its reluctance to interfere with the
conduct of foreign relations in defemng to the political branches on immigration
matters.279 Its review of Ma and Zadvydas, though, presents the Court with an
opportunity to disclaim foreign relations concerns as a blanket justification by the
govenunent for deference. It is not being suggested that immigration cases never affect
foreign policy. But an assumption by the government that it automatically does here is
unrealistic.280As Respondent argues in Ma, there is no indication that releasing a
deportable alien has any effect on the government's ability to continue negotiations with a

'"

See supra note 216 and related text for the holding of the Western District of Washington Court
procedural due process requires a hearing before an immigrationjudge at which evidence could be
presented to support release pending deportation.
75 See Brief for the Petitioners, Reno v. Ma, 2000 U.S. Briefs at *44.
276 See id.
"'See id.
'78 See supra note 62 and related text.
279 E.g., Fonp. Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 705-06; Knauff, 338 U.S.at 542; Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588-91.
See Stephen Legomsky, "Plenary Power," 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 261-269 for a discussion on foreign
affairs and the political question doctrine. Legomsky suggests that courts should ask in each individual
case whether judicial review would interfere with foreign policy. Even if it does interfere, he further argues

'"

